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 Abstract 
From February 2006 in Cambodia, national health deciders and 
international agencies are re-organizing a new health policy agenda consisting 
of the promotion of free access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) for all the 
infected persons having less than 200 CD4 counts throughout the country 
(soon it will be less than 250 CD4).  Such a decision is definitely a step 
foreword if one remembers that HIV positive people have been totally denied 
ARV treatment till 2001. With the exception of Thailand, Cambodia is the 
first nation in Asia and South-East Asia adopting such a health delivery 
coverage, having in mind that it is one of the poorest countries in the region, 
with at least 80% of the population living below the poverty line. Unlike in 
Brazil ten years ago, universal access represents a challenge not only from a 
health perspective but also from social, political and economical perspectives.  
The paper intends to present quickly the evolution of the health situation 
related to HIV/AIDS treatment, before focusing on some hidden concepts 
underlying the public process, run by local planers and outsiders, whose 
common aim is to “put the treatment first for every body”, according to the 
classical rhetoric of medicine accessible for all, including the most deprived.  
A fair statement, clad in compassionate slogans, remains however 
insufficient if the drugs delivery system is not elaborated within a sustainable 
approach (quality of care, diversity of drugs protocols, socio cultural 
considerations, training of medical staffs, etc.). We also may wonder whether 
the new deal concerning universal access reflects other policies and politics 
like the ones tacitly expressed by persons or groups who, aware that a health 
system is a political system, know that a health focus on the epidemic will 
create both national and personal prestige, and attract donors for other 
development issues in a country still under economic perfusion. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The analysis of public intervention represents a constitutive dimension for 
the interpretation of the policies and projects of development. In this 
perspective, it is a thematic for investigation as a whole. It becomes 
scientifically relevant to be loyal to the theoretical and methodological 
innovative aspects related to a politico-anthropological insight, if one of the 
aims of a research is to contribute through long term field enquiries to a 
better understanding of institutional and social processes operating in the 
public policies for development, specifically within a particular representative 
sector related to health. Subsequently, institutions as well as actors of 
development become a subject for investigation together or separately1. In 
this paper, which is presented as an introduction to a further broader analysis 
having a more systemic overview, I decide by choice and also by constraint 
(insufficient data available at the stage of the enquiry), to concentrate on 
individuals and not on institutions, even if social developers are part of 
institutions and reflect to some extent, but not always, the main ideologies of 
the agency employing them.  
Deciders, planners, politicians, implementers and other individuals are 
part of a chain of social actors. And each link of the chain not only interacts 
with other social actors but lives, develops particular convictions and 
rationalities, and finally engages in various personal strategies mixing 
professional responsibilities, personal well being and spiritual sustenance. 
Even if a reflexive consideration is not yet prevalent in developing agencies, 
such preoccupation appears more and more relevant in the field of political 
and anthropological sciences, considering the fact that, despite the energy 
devoted to generating the right policy models in development (at every levels 
of intervention and in different domains of action), little attention is given to 
the relationship between these models and the practices and the events that 
they are expected to generate or legitimize, as David Moose argued in a paper 
recently published2. The author remind us that understanding the 
relationships between policy discourse and field practices has been hampered 
by the dominance of two opposing views on development policy that can be 
characterized as follows3. On the one hand there is an instrumental view of 
policy as rational problem solving, directly shaping the way in which 
development is done. On the other hand, there is a critical way of analysing 
                                                
1 Jean-François Baré (ed.), Paroles d’experts. Etudes sur la pensée institutionnelle du développement 
Paris, 2005, Karthala. 
2 David Moose, Is Good Policy unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and 
Practice, Development and Change, 2004, 35(4) : 639-671. 
3  David Moose, ibid, 641 
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the socio-political dynamics that sees policy as a rationalizing discourse 
concealing hidden purposes of bureaucratic power or dominance, in which 
the true political intent of development is hidden behind a cloak of rational 
planning. From my own point of view adopted in this paper – which does 
not take into account the larger scope of the analysis undertaken by Moose 
considering not why but how development is made – I intend to do justice 
to the complexity of a specific policy-making undertaken in Cambodia, by 
showing how and under which circumstances this so-called policy is in fact 
interconnected with other logics of developments having little, or even 
nothing, to do with the proposed goals of the initial target which is the path 
to universal access to treatment against AIDS. 
I have divided the paper into three parts. First I shall briefly introduce the 
collective programme. This introduction provides the contextual framework 
of what will be developed afterwards, specifically the rapid scaling up strategy 
of antiretroviral treatment. Second, I shall explain the main approaches that 
have been implemented for the field work. Far from being a methodological 
digression, it shows how the data collection has been conditioned, insofar as 
any production of knowledge strongly depends on the way one manages to 
obtain information. In other words, the choice of a suitable methodology 
adapted to the socio cultural realities and to the numerous and ambivalent 
social actors’ “ways of planning, thinking and doing” remains vital if we want 
to penetrate the concepts underlying the development process. Lastly, I shall 
focus on the path to universal access to treatment against the epidemic. This 
theme has been chosen because it is the new given strategy of the Cambodian 
national government, resulting from the latest policies of the UN System4. 
Because of its actuality, it becomes a relevant matter of investigation. Our 
purpose here is less to provide a mere description of the agenda of the 
universal access strategy, framed in a consistent official policy than to analyse 
the way the Khmer national government shifts its policy from its “let’s wait 
and see” mood of four years ago to one of the most aggressive statements 
promoting “free treatment for all”. In other words, how and why a specific 
government has been in a position to change its health policy, and what does 
it mean in terms of development impact? 
 
 
                                                
4 Quite a few countries have been involved in the 3 by 5 strategy launched in 2004 by the WHO, and 
actually in the universal access policy encouraged by the WHO, as well as other United Nations bodies. 
We will focus here specifically on the Cambodian issue, without assessing what it represents as either a 
representative model or a typical feature of what is going on between international developers and 
national deciders. 
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Context of the collective research in Cambodia5 
Without considering the unorganised private and non-formal sectors, 
antiretroviral drugs have been officially available in Cambodia since 2001. At 
that time, a few hospitals in Phnom Penh and subsequently in the provinces 
launched proper care-cum-drug-delivery centres for a limited number of 
AIDS infected persons. The potential strategy of universal access to HAART 
(highly active anti-retroviral treatment) was not yet on the agenda, not even 
thinkable or debated, when this research was launched in early 2004.  
It was the time of the 3 by 5 strategy within the UN. This strategy was a 
global initiative under the technical leadership of the WHO that aims to 
provide 3 million ART treatments by the end of 20056. To reach this goal, 
the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB was supposed to give 
financial support at the country level.  
In the course of time, interactions between external donors, multilateral 
agencies, non governmental organizations (NGOs), national bodies and civil 
society have been repeatedly reformulated. This led to the crucial questions of 
national management and, to some extent, local governance. In spite of 
foreign assistance, Cambodian institutions were supposed to be more actively 
involved in the decision-making processes. They have been as well in charge 
of proposing their own health guidelines, dealing with external funds and 
distributing them to the various NGOs involved in care and treatment, 
knowing that more than 90 NGOs are presently working in the field of 
HIV/AIDS. In Cambodia, more than 3,500 persons came under treatment 
at the end of 2004 (but without GF money and mainly with private money 
from NGOs like Médecins sans frontiers France and Belgium/Holland), 
7,600 in August 2005, and more than 10,000 in December 2005. 
In this context, the main objective of the present research was to analyse the 
policies and strategies for the distribution of ART drugs currently existing in 
Cambodia and to see to what extent and under which conditions this 
implementing process is going to increase over the long term, and eventually 
be progressively taken as a model for a sustainable and relevant national 
health care policy. This objective has been divided in two subordinated 
aspects: 
 
                                                
5 The programme is named: “The politics and policies for the extension of ARV drugs in Cambodia: 
perception, implementation, obstacles and impacts”. Only some of the scientific orientations of the 
research programme that are directly related to the topic of the paper are presented. 
6 World Health Organization, Treating 3 Million by 2005, Making it happen, WHO Strategy, Geneva, 
September 2003, World Health Organization, 55. 
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1) First, the identification of the anti-AIDS organisation 
system, of its potential capacity and ability to follow on a 
middle and long-term basis HIV infected persons. We 
started with an observation of its complex functioning: 
policies and politics, operational constraints, evolution and 
stability of the multifarious strategies of decisions and 
interactions with the social dynamics. Even though we 
focused on what is happening on the Cambodian government 
side, special attention has been given to external interferences. 
We kept in mind that the country still remains under 
economic and political dependence (International donors, aid 
institutions, multilateral agencies, etc.). We choose to 
consider these factors in order to take into account acceptances, 
re-appropriations, structural obstacles, resulting conflicts and 
potential benefits that such huge international cooperation 
may generate. 
 
 2) Second, we wanted to know about the feed-backs to the 
patients of the national policy, through a long-term concrete 
follow up of the beneficiaries. An attentive examination of the 
discourses, perceptions and practices of both HIV infected 
persons and medical staff regarding access to treatment 
enabled us to go beyond the rhetoric of the planners, 
developers and deciders. We aimed at determining socio-
medical criteria conditioning access to treatment, having in 
mind that these identified criteria may lead to a sustainable 
adherence related to the ARV drugs in the country.  
 
3) In order to have a more systematic overview, we observed 
the various strategies of care implemented not only in 
hospitals but outside the health structures within the society 
itself (care continuum, home-based care, community care, 
ART procurement). 
 
Initially, the main location of the program was in Phnom Penh, specifically 
for the political and anthropological analysis related to public health policies 
and interventions. Most of the decisions and implementation processes were 
taken, in fact, in the capital city. But due to the decentralisation of access to 
therapy to reach the 3 by 5 target, we extended our activity out of Phnom 
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Penh, into four provinces (Siem Reap, Takeo, Kampot, Kandal). The 
extension of our work enabled us to integrate into our research a geographical 
and social comparative dimension. We wanted to follow the evolution of how 
international and national guidelines, along with policy planners’ 
interferences, were de facto decentralized and implemented outside the capital 
in provincial cities and in rural districts. Everywhere, non governmental 
organisations contributed directly with the government - sometimes 
separately - to the geographical extension of care and treatment. 
 
 
Methodology and perspectives of approach 
The first scope of our investigation has been devoted to understanding on 
which basis health policies are decided and whether consequently they have 
been implemented in a similar perspective or with some adjustments, taking 
into consideration political, socio-cultural contexts and provincial public 
health specificities. For this purpose, policy planners, deciders, health 
development specialists, representatives from multilateral agencies, external 
donors, NGOs as well as members of the civil society became, de facto, our 
privileged interlocutors. 
In the second phase, we decided to collect feed-back from people living 
with HIV/AIDS. The first group of individuals with whom we developed 
on-going relationships has been infected persons and their families. These 
individuals have not all been receiving ART from the official sector: they may 
have been refused or rejected from public hospitals or are not yet eligible for 
help from NGOs (as a member of their active file). Other contacted persons 
whose attitude and discourse are extremely relevant to understanding people’s 
voices were the those who participated, in different manners and to different 
degrees in civil society’s efforts, sometimes through associations, for advocacy 
or, more strongly, as activists who claim the right for the whole infected 
population to receive the treatment.  
How do we organize our research? The team is composed of a group of ten 
researchers, half of them Khmer and the other half foreign advanced students, 
with different assignments and terms of time (from six months to three 
years). The present research is therefore a collective one, based on an 
interdisciplinary approach including public health, anthropology, sociology, 
political economy and political science. It aims to strengthen a local research 
team recruited from Phnom Penh University. Each student develops a 
particular topic. The first concentrates her efforts on providing an overview of 
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the ART delivery system in the private sector, through analysis of the 
international pharmaceutical network, marketing strategies, and linkages with 
local providers and doctors. The second focuses on the emerging 
mobilization of social groups - specifically among people living with AIDS - 
in their expectations for more equal access to ART. Two other persons, acting 
as key research assistants for establishing various contacts with the infected 
patients, are following different categories of people receiving home-based 
care, either from government institutions or with autonomous support 
associations. 
The IRD French team has integrated five French contributors. A student 
in medicine and anthropology is identifying how the selection process to 
receive ART is elaborated in a given urban health infrastructure. A Ph D 
fellow in Anthropology is focused on the socio cultural representations related 
to ART among health professionals and the general population. She intends 
to reveal the vernacular social construction of the medicines and the meaning 
of “what is a treatment” for the infected people. A French-Khmer scholar in 
anthropology is working on the social and spiritual involvement of Buddhist 
monks. She is providing an account of the formal linkages that the religious 
organizations establish with the national AIDS policy. Another Ph D fellow 
in anthropology is analyzing the involvement of the “experts-patients”. 
Experts-patient is an expression formulated at the international level to denote 
the contribution to the improvement of the struggle against the HIV 
epidemic by employing - and professionalizing – HIV infected persons. 
Apart from coordinating the research activities, I focus on discourses and 
practices from politicians, planners, deciders, social actors, public health 
experts and doctors in charge of various organizational aspects and operational 
assignments related to HIV/AIDS care and treatment, including drug 
procurement and the distribution system at the national/international level. 
These contributions are going to provide new facts and figures on the 
quickly changing situation of Cambodian HIV/AIDS policy. Each personal 
research project complements and strengthens the others. Thus we develop 
together a multi-centred complementary approach, so as to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the social and political dynamics 
underlying the fundamental issue related to care and treatment. In order to 
avoid research that could be criticized as existing in isolation, we undertake a 
political-anthropological monitoring. This means that we develop an 
interactive partnership – even if not always on formal grounds - with some of 
our interlocutors who are usually highly specialized but do not have an 
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opportunity to grasp the broader comprehensive socio-political and medical 
insight that we hope to reach. 
Qualitative inquiries are systematically privileged according to classical 
anthropological methodology. With our interlocutors who are health 
professionals, we try to let them speak not of what they are supposed to do 
but how they manage to apply their expertise into action. This is a side of 
themselves that generally they are not used to revealing. Concerning 
laypersons, we regularly meet them, strengthen the trust, encourage intimate 
relationships, follow their quest for treatment access and quality of life, and 
enable them to speak about what they perceive as their own personal 
concerns. Sometimes - if we can - we act when we are confronted with 
situations that need to be changed7. In such cases the research eventually 
becomes a struggle. We have decided that we stand on the patient’s side and 
we help them to receive what they are normally authorized to receive either 
from the government or from a NGO.  
Otherwise, we do not “perform” focus group discussions or rapid 
assessment procedures (quick quantitative enquiries) because we are far from 
convinced of their relevance for scientific research. Constructive 
interpretations of data depends on a long term analysis emanating from 
observation, oriented enquiries and, whenever possible, “participative 
involvement”.  
It would be too long to provide in detail the methodological background. 
But this preliminary presentation leads me to introduce the topic that raises 
should raise debate and concentrate the attention of all health developers. 
With the exception of Thailand, for the first time in Asia, a country – small, 
disorganised and poor – has oriented its policy towards universal access. Let 
us analyse this important, timely and extremely sensitive issue. 
 
 
Path for universal access to treatment:  
political issues and controversial implementation 
Cambodia is categorized as one of the least developed countries in the world 
with an estimated GNP per capita of US 280. For the last 20 years the 
Khmer territory, with 13 millions inhabitants as of 2005, has been 
                                                
7 For instance, one religious NGO which established a rescue home for infected mothers and children 
was preventing access to care and treatment for the mothers (they were just waiting for them do die, 
before taking the orphans into a so-called “new family” taking the form of an international orphanage). 
Many patients started to ask us to support them in lobbying to receive proper attention, or not to be 
discriminated intentionally by medical staff. 
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rebuilding its whole societal environment as well as a health system 
dismantled by war. Nowadays guerrilla warfare is over, administrative efforts 
are being undertaken, development assistance has made substantial progress 
(at the same time as suffering serious drawbacks in every sector), and political 
stability prevails, even if a proper application of democratic values is still in 
the pipe line. Cambodia is a country in transition. Institutional mechanisms, 
including the health system have to be elaborated with new infrastructures 
and regenerated human resources. But these components are scarcely 
apparent in spite of the massive aid and a potential internal capacity that have 
been obstructed by vote-catching, social and political nepotism. A middle 
class has emerged quickly along with an upper class (composed of politicians, 
high ranking persons and the top military) that has managed to take 
advantage, for their own profit, of the so-called development inputs.  
Within a decade, socio-economical inequalities have increased, corruption 
has become rampant and the gap between rural and urban areas (mostly 
Phnom Penh) has widened.  More than 70 % of the population remains in 
villages in very poor living conditions8 (far from NGOs and public 
amenities) and the migration flow to the capital is tremendous.  
The average minimum salary of 30 US dollars per month for those 
employed in government jobs or in the factories concentrated around Phnom 
Penh (run by foreign companies) allows, with great difficulties, a single 
person, but not at all his family, to survive decently. Debt is the major 
vernacular strategy to temporarily overcome this problematic socio-economic 
configuration9. Needless to say, health complications aggravate the generalized 
debt process10, and various pieces of research and unpublished reports 
compiled by doctors working in NGOs offering treatment have noticed that 
people living with HIV/AIDS are one of the groups which is most victimised 
by this bogus solidarity system11.  
In terms of health and development, the government’s overall strategy, in 
agreement with the external donors, is to improve equity and accessibility to 
essential health services to rebuild confidence in the public health sector. 
                                                
8 Data on poverty in Cambodia is controversial. For instance, the Cambodian Economic Survey in 1999 
was carried out in two rounds of interviews. The first round resulted in a headcount poverty rate of 
64%, the second 35,9%. Needless to say, both those statistics (even the more optimistic) reflect more 
an intention to show a very particular representation of the socio-economic reality than to identify, 
with adequate tools, a representative sample of the population. 
9 Oxfam Hong Kong, Women agenda for change: the debt bondage, Phnom Penh, 27 October 2004, 
57. 
10  Maurits Van Pelt, Health Consultant, personal communication (Phnom Penh), 2005. 
11 Interestingly, a “key” UN report hardly considers the primordial impact of debt that lead to an 
increasing poverty. See: Bloom D.E. et al., Health, Wealth, AIDS and Poverty. The Case of Cambodia, 
Geneva, 2001, UNAIDS, 34. 
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Despite widespread poverty, many Cambodians still opt to pay for private 
sector services rather than use what is perceived to be a low quality public 
health sector, where services are supposed to be free, but where patients have 
regularly to pay money under the table and are ill-treated. The apparently 
equitable strategy is formulated by people who have the know-how to design 
a politically correct policy supposed to attract international funds. In reality, 
it remains pure rhetoric, elaborated with fashionable and attractive concepts 
like “best practices”, “community participation”, “ethical inputs”, etc. Besides 
a few exceptions (coming either from a particular public hospital, a NGO 
programme, or both together), it hardly appears in the field. They are neither 
the social commitment nor the political willingness to strengthen and clarify 
such vague political assignments so that they can be effectively implemented. 
The declarations remain on the paper they are written on. 
In spite of a few constructive changes, the socio-economic and health 
situation has been more or less the same for the last ten years, at least in terms 
of equal distribution. It is in this context that the HIV epidemic burst out 
and spread quickly in the country. Sentinel surveillances revealed that from 
1997 Cambodia was experiencing the highest prevalence and incidence of 
HIV/AIDS in the Asian-Pacific Region. In spite of different statistical 
estimates (due to different methods of calculation), it was roughly estimated 
to be 2,6 % at that time12.  
Until 2000, the only activity that was implemented to fight the epidemic 
was prevention, even at the level of the NGOs sector, with very few 
exceptions. However, it was estimated that 18,900 new infections of AIDS 
occurred in 2002 (apparently less than in the previous years) and that 
157,000 people lived with HIV/AIDS (also less than before, and probably 
because many had died). Care and treatment finally became major issues to 
be considered, after ten years of silence. But it still remained for too long a 
time nothing more than a topic of endless office discussion. 
A change in policy does not occur simply. The right for people to have a 
chance to access to treatment has been a fight. Civil society was neither invited 
to participate in the debates and decisions (not even as an observer) nor was it 
allowed to present any claim. Such mobilisation would have been interpreted 
with acrimony as a sign of irrelevant protest by ignorant people unaware of 
the structural constraints prevailing in the government administration and in 
the international luxury bureaux. On the other hand, international agencies, 
                                                
12 NCHADS, Cambodia’s Behavioral Surveillance Survey 1997-1999, Phnom Penh, 2001, Ministry of 
Health, 29. ; NCHADS, Report on Sentinel Surveillance in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 1999, Ministry of 
Health, 63.   
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including the WHO and other UN bodies, did not provide any support to 
access to treatment prior to 2000. According to them, it was too early. The 
country was not prepared, even though many people – we will never know 
the exact number amount – were dying of AIDS every day. One can remark 
that even if a given country is not yet sufficiently prepared, international 
agencies along with the government are supposed in the meantime to take 
some necessary steps in order to prepare the country to absorb a new health 
policy. But this not been the case, at least for the UN, the Asian 
Development Bank and other bilateral entities, in which most of their 
numerous consultants repeat that their mandate (which parallels their 
professional recognition within their own agency) was to go in the same 
direction as the country policy (whatever its drawbacks and incoherences), 
and eventually to strengthen it, either through advocacy, planning 
reinforcement or, last but not least, by designing attractive written policies, 
irrespective of their proper adequate implementation. This remained, at the 
most, a second priority. 
Only a few medical NGOs (at first two, then three at the beginning up to 
2003) had the initiative and the courage to welcome infected people. I say 
courageous because some of them have been threatened by public health 
officials, even by international experts. With a qualified staff, their own drugs 
procurement and distribution system, these NGOs managed however to 
show that HIV persons, including those among the poorest, were fully able 
to observe the constraints of regularly taking the treatment, in accordance with 
the given prescription.  
It was proof that the statements of international officers were full of 
preconceived ideas (among them: prevention is more important than care, 
treatment is not cost/effective, people are not responsible, etc.13). 
Little by little, both officially appointed Khmers14 and the community of 
expatriates in charge of monitoring and evaluating the AIDS policy emerged 
from their air-conditioned offices and discovered a social reality that they were 
not aware of, leading to the conclusion that it was possible to treat as well as 
prevent. The constructive efforts undertaken by a few NGOs members 
generated a precedent.  
                                                
13 Bourdier F., The Extension of HAART Drugs Delivery in Cambodia: from Socio-Medical to Political 
and Economic Challenges, Chang Mai (Thailand), 10-12 November 2003, Paper presented at Chang-Mai 
Conference on « Social Sciences and AIDS in South-eastern Asia: research inventory, priorities and on 
going perspectives », 15. 
14 Not all of course. Some of them – including the NCHADS director – encouraged the first NGOs to 
show the way (by including care, treatment and prevention) that the country could afterwards follow. 
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Once faced with a concrete reality, it created a precedent because neither the 
government nor the international community involved in Cambodia’s affairs 
could continue to encourage a strategy strictly based on prevention since the 
care component has been proved to be feasible. It would be regarded as a 
conservative policy, in comparison to what had been achieved apparently with 
success by foreign NGOs (some of them considered by medical activists).  
On the one hand, it was the perfect moment for those officially in charge of 
the struggle against the epidemic to elaborate a real care and treatment policy. 
And to control it. No question of allowing a mushrooming of private, 
isolated drug-distribution centres that, according to some deciders (either 
outsiders or local), would do what they want to do, with their own ideological 
statements, even if they had been the care pioneers.  
A health system is a political system. In that respect, it became a challenge 
for some decision makers, strongly supported by their government and 
international agencies, to emerge as the leading persons, possessing the 
capacity, and sufficient power to be “operational” (as it was termed) for the 
launching of a planned policy, perceiving care and treatment as a human and 
medical priority.  
Negotiations between the Ministry of Health, more precisely with the 
Institution in charge of the struggle against HIV/AIDS, and private NGO 
entities have been, however, more complex than it seems. The numerous 
guidelines were scarcely adapted to medical and social contexts15. The public 
sector lacked human resources and adequate health establishments, while 
some NGOs structures have field experience and were more technically and 
medically advanced. So the first needed the second to receive basic teaching, 
monitoring and expertise: training in infectious diseases, and increased skills 
in the public health and equipment planning needed for a better following 
up.  
On the other hand, it is true that the NGO centres were concentrated in a 
very few locations (there were only three in the country, principally in 
Phnom Penh). This means that infected patients, whenever they could, 
would migrate from their distant native or living places to find somewhere to 
stay in cities, which were synonymous with medical hope and recovering 
health. One of the concerns of the government was to avoid this migration 
and to organize, step by step, a better spatial integration of health services so 
as to respond to the medical demands of the infected population.  
                                                
15 By way of comparison, a small country like Cambodia has written many more guidelines than huge 
countries like Brazil.  Size does not reflect the complexity, but one may wonder whether repeated and 
compartmentalized guidelines generate clarity or obscurity for those who are supposed to follow them.  
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In order to know where the establishment of drug distribution centres 
should receive priority, more than one hundred HIV voluntary test centres 
have been created16. They are not spread evenly over the country (some 
provinces have been forgotten without any apparent reason, apart from the 
fact that nobody wants to go there) but concentrated in most of the populated 
areas. Along with deployment of screening facilities, the government started 
for the first time in 2004 to establish HIV/AIDS clinics, based in provincial 
referral hospitals and specifically in places viewed as “hot spots”, where the 
epidemic was supposed to be more prevalent than in other low-incidence 
zones. In most cases, the appointed provincial health secretaries who used to 
work quite independently from the central board in Phnom Penh started to 
receive, under government supervision, financial support, regular training 
from international agencies like CDC, FHI, MSF Belgium and Holland and 
also from emerging local and efficient NGOs like CHC (Cambodian Health 
Committee). Paradoxically, the geographical decentralisation encouraged by 
Phnom Penh increased the control of public health institutions from the capital 
over the provinces and reinforced a process of centralisation.  
Furthermore, there has existed a financial prerequisite to implementing the 
new national policy. The country has been in a position to regulate and draw 
up a middle plan with the Global Fund. This agency created in 2001 - 
based in Geneva and relying on international donations – operates as a 
financial instrument, not an implementing entity. It makes available and 
leverages additional financial resources. It supports programmes that evolve 
from national plans and gives priority to Cambodia which has been one of its 
important beneficiaries. Cambodia has now seen over two years of the 
implementation of Global Fund programmes, including those which involve 
the distribution of ART medicines. Currently, 101 million dollars of grants 
provided in four rounds of funding, have been approved for the HIV/AIDS 
component alone. This is not only because the HIV prevalence was high: 
other countries experiencing more desperate situations do not receive 
anything, or much less. It is because Cambodia has managed to show clearly 
– at least on paper – its national plans and priorities, in accordance with what 
                                                
16 Even, in fact, if the screening of the people is not strictly aimed at providing treatment to them. For 
developers, a trend to propose systematic HIV testing also justifies the partial outcome of a care policy. 
It is something visible, without an evident outcome, undertaken independently and without a proper 
follow up. For instance, local actors who are in contact with the newly identified infected population 
remain doubtful of the impact of the HIV test, which acts as a death sentence (when someone is 
declared positive) if there is no guarantee of a proper follow up and treatment as soon as it becomes 
necessary. In other words, screening  which is supposed to be at the crossroads between prevention and 
treatment remains a first (and partial) act,  and not the complete aspect of a more general 
implementation programme, leading to the universal access of treatment for those who need it. 
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was perceived as being adjusted to its socio-epidemiological context and 
political capacity of local management.  
To receive grants, it needed a core structure that was well established, ie. a 
local public-private partnership which develops and submits grant 
proposals, and later on oversees the implementation of funded programmes 
(17 programmes were devoted to AIDS in the last round in 2005), 
including some run by medical foreign NGOs. Subsequently, this new 
funding mechanism has five major socio-political, organizational and medical 
implications:  
 
1) First, it creates the inevitable gear stick for whoever is in the driving seat 
for organizing an apparently sustainable huge programme for delivering 
treatment to an increasing population who need it. 
2) Second, it reduces duplication of programmes at the ministerial level.  
3) Third, NCHADS which is the national authority in charge of 
implementing HIV/AIDS programmes, and mostly the operational aspects of 
care and treatment, now has the control over other entities – including 
NGOs – willing to receive money from the Global Fund. NCHADS 
evaluates the feasibility of each programme proposed by what is called a sub-
recipient, but the latter has to comply with the national guidelines elaborated 
by the national body in terms of geographical location, ART protocol lines, 
continuum of care dimensions, number of persons to be treated, and so on.  
4) Fourth, the Global Fund participates in strengthening the cohesion 
between national deciders and representatives of multilateral agencies, while 
private local entities find themselves more and more dependent within a new 
hierarchical order in which they are not in a position anymore to negotiate as 
before, even if according to their experience with sick persons they feel the 
necessity of articulating macro-logical or external constraints imposed on 
them by contextual situations, for instance the issue of treatment lines.  
5) Fifth, this international funding mechanism has generated efforts towards 
accountability for the resources committed and disbursed regularly by 
rounds, as well as towards a new type of adequate supervising system for the 
programmes implemented. This point is of extreme importance in terms of 
health management and forecasting, if one remembers the poor organisation 
and “zero degree” level plan adopted in different ministries. Many health 
experts maintain that the positive results of this necessary management aspect 
were unthinkable five years ago. Nonetheless, this point has to be mitigated. 
The Global Fund established mechanisms for transparency by creating 
bodies such as the Principal Recipient (PR) and the Sub-Recipients (SR), 
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but due to local corruption, the diversion of money may still occur however 
because there is no proper follow up and no adequate tracking system on how 
the national government uses and distributes money. 
 
One of the special features I would like to emphasize is that the present 
HIV/AIDS care policy in Cambodia depends on many actors, having 
different interests, ideologies and convictions. They manage, in addition to an 
image of harmonized plan, to set their own hidden agendas. It is a very 
simple and evident observation but this point has to be taken into 
consideration to understand the diversity and complexity of its functioning. 
Even if we cannot identify all sections involved in care activities, we can infer 
that due to their number, they need to be organized and properly articulated, 
which is not always the case. 
International agencies constitute a big family – sometimes with naughty 
sons and daughters or uncles who can be re-educated by convincing 
arguments - in spite of apparent conflicts and disputes regarding topics that 
definitely are not the most important concerns for the future of the 
populations supposed to be the beneficiaries. Many meetings, think tanks 
and seminars are related to practices they want to put a name on (rather than 
implementing concretely) and concepts they use (one of the purposes for the 
discussions found in their agendas is to decide upon about which word 
should be employed in the numerous guidelines that only a few persons read 
(and are in fact allowed to read17): stigma or discrimination? capacity 
building for who? community participation or mass participation? 
empowerment of who and why? etc.).  
As a financing institution, the Global Fund relies upon its partners to 
provide technical assistance and support. Agencies like DFID (the English 
bilateral agency for cooperation), the World Bank, UNAIDS, WHO and all 
the other UN agencies try – or at least try to demonstrate that they are trying 
- to work with contradictory agendas side by side. Apart from some 
drawbacks, depending on external and internal constraints due to health 
actors' mandates and due their professional and personal strategies, there has 
been however a relative consensus in Cambodia with regards to the scaling 
up of antiretroviral treatments. The WHO has played a distinctive role by 
providing normative leadership on international standards for medical 
responses to AIDS. On the other hand, challenges by health specialists have 
                                                
17 Quite a few social observers, health actors belonging to the NGOs sector and even to the public 
sector told us they have not been in a position to obtain some of the guidelines they expected to read, in 
spite of their repeated requests. 
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been well documented, specifically the ones elaborated by the MSF campaign 
to essential medicines18. Another criticism has been formulated by reputable 
private physicians. Unfortunately, some medical NGOs argue that it is 
impossible - and even dangerous - to give a standardized first line treatment 
to all infected people, even if they are from a poor country like Cambodia19. 
Reiterating the words of the well-known physician and researcher G. 
Montagner, a respected authority in the domain of HIV/AIDS, some 
specialists in infectious diseases say nobody can encourage that a second rate 
system of medicine should be taken as a model. 
In terms of adequate objectives to be promoted, and due to the opportunity 
offered by the Global Fund resources, the WHO and the UNAIDS 
secretariat set an urgent challenge for the country : the “3 by 5” target of 
providing ART to 3 million people living with HIV/AIDS in low and 
middle-income countries by the end of 2005. This corresponds to treating 
just half of those in need. Such an objective started to be put in practice in 
2004 in Cambodia, with the unconditional approval of the Khmer 
authorities. It means that at least 10,000 infected persons should receive a 
treatment by the end of December 2005.  
It was not clear at that time if the number of 10,000 was in fact half of the 
people who needed treatment (in 2006, the figure has been denied, and has 
reached only 17,500 which is the figure given in a recent WHO/UNAIDS 
report20). There were definitely more, according to many specialists, but they 
were invisible. No doubt, epidemiological data was better calculated in 
Cambodia than in some other countries, for example in Africa or in some 
neighbouring countries such as Laos and Vietnam, but they remain estimates 
and mathematical extrapolations. They were based on sentinel surveys during 
the prevention campaign in some of the believed risk populations at that 
time. They remain social constructions. This has a drastic implication, not 
only in terms of pure epidemiological investigations but also in terms of lives 
to be saved, insofar as the deciders, willing to show that their country could 
reach the international « 3 by 5 » objective, came to an implicit agreement 
that to have no more than 10,000 people under treatment was not really 
essential.  A strange, subjective public health decision… 
                                                
18 Médecins sans Frontières, The Effects of the 2005 Trips Implementation deadline on access to 
Medicines, February 2005, 3 p.; Médecins sans Frontières, Clinical AIDS care Guidelines for Resource-
poor Settings, Brussels, March 2001, First edition published by MSF Belgium, 159. 
19  Dr. Didier Laureillard, personal interviews, Phnom Penh, 2004 and 2005. 
20 World Health Organization & UNAIDS, Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretroviral Therapy. A 
report on “3 by 5” and  beyond, Geneva, March 2006, World Health Organization, 83. 
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Whatever the mathematical model elaborated for estimating the number of 
people to be treated, the scaling up of HIV treatment has resulted in a rapid 
intervention. It has been quick and disorganized. At any cost, the government 
wanted to deliver treatment, free of charge, at about twenty places in the 
country. Nobody can deny that the intention was non-ethical but it has been 
poorly prepared. It could have been better planned long ago. Doctors’ 
training came late, with a very limited time, while some AIDS specialists had 
already asked the deciders if for years they could contribute to the 
dissemination of their knowledge. They have never been heard. Assistance 
has been refused by NGOs. Also, most of the infrastructure run by the 
public health sector was – and still is – in a desperate state and without 
needed materials. Many patients were reluctant to visit government centres 
and tried without success to be accepted by well equipped hospitals (because 
they were overbooked) run by important NGOs or, if they had sufficient 
money, to go to private doctors who had established lucrative anonymous 
AIDS clinics.  
The deciders concentrated on a deadline. It was perceived as a result per se to 
reach the target suggested by UN agencies. The world was keeping an eye on 
Cambodian efforts. Strangely, the challenge was to find sufficient people. 
Propaganda appeared in some provincial referral hospitals: “Come if you are 
infected, we welcome you and you will receive quickly the proper drugs”, or 
“if you know someone infected, bring him with safety, you will receive feed-
back”. Some NGOs on a good footing with the government, participated in 
the “mass identification” of infected persons. They used trucks to bring 
county-side people first to be tested and then, if positive, to be treated 
“without delay”, as a few volunteers used to say. During the last six month 
period before the deadline, observers used the term “hunting” to describe the 
intensity of the movement to locate infected people.  On the other side, 
doctors in charge of the scaling up of HIV treatment in particular provinces 
were constantly under pressure by the officials in charge of the target objective 
in Phnom Penh. Some doctors were anxious about being fired if they did not 
fulfil the quota of persons to whom they should give treatment. Some 
accepted play their role, while some have been more cautious and did provide 
treatment immediately, without adequate and normal physical examination 
and without proper clinical tests that take normally between one and two 
months. It was said – and confirmed in a few areas - that Khmer people 
could receive ART within one or two weeks after being declared positive, 
which is a medical absurdity.  
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Other doctors, feeling that they had no choice if they wanted to keep their 
professional positions – or hoped to receive promotions – complied. They 
did not want to verify if the receipt of quick standardized treatment can be 
dangerous, even in case of opportunistic disease. For instance, a few persons 
co-infected with TB and AIDS started both medications at nearly the same 
time and could not survive because of the effects of the medication. 
These drawbacks have been considered as “side-effects”. Infected people in 
danger and those who could not take the treatment due to complications have 
been tacitly accused of endangering the success of the drug distribution 
system. They did not comply with the system while, normally, one could 
expect that the system should comply with people’s needs. Not the contrary. 
Finally, in early January 2006, Cambodian developers have been tempted 
to claim that they got the Nobel Prize for the “3 by 5”. Without any doubt, 
the challenge was believed to have been overcome. In fact, nearly half of the 
patients received ART through MSF centres and without direct contact with 
“3 by 5” initiatives21. The country could show that at least 12 000 infected 
people will continue to live with drugs (36% of the people needing it), 
forgetting about those who died because of the rapid course of treatment 
action, forgetting about ambiguous follow-ups, forgetting about tremenduous 
lack of the basic aminities in the health services, forgetting also that social and 
economic conditions that have caused the collapse of the public health system 
could not be corrected overnight … 
From a scientific point of view, any analysis should be balanced, but such a 
basic sociological principle, called symmetry, has rarely been taken into 
consideration by stakeholders and most of the health politicians in 
Cambodia. The main argument is that “a health system in formation cannot 
deal with best practices at the beginning but they will come, little by little” or 
“we need to build more building capacity”, or “cultural commitment”, and so 
on. Sadly, inadequate health care infrastructures and shortages of trained 
workers, inadequate diagnostics and discrimination still hamper public 
health efforts. And little attention is given to these key factors either by 
international agents or by national actors. There is a 
shyness/reluctance/refusal to understand the reasons behind and a lack of 
involvement to find appropriate strategies to mitigate them 
The current bottlenecks to this rapid scale up have never been approached 
or considered of public health importance. For instance, it is known that 
                                                
21 Moreover, the WHO in Geneva did not recognize it: Cambodia mentioned previously that about 
23,000 people needed to be under treatment (end of 2004) while a more accurate epidemiological 
source mentions 35,000. 
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many people died with inadequate treatments and insufficient care, but 
ironically they have been registered as beneficiaries of the “3 by 5” by both 
the government and the UN agencies.  The side-effects of a political public 
health orientation are totally neglected and it is even considered dangerous to 
analyse them; according to some developers, it could reduce its positive 
impact and discourage internal and external promoters of the national policy. 
In fact, these are arguments that show more respect for the well-being of the 
health planners than the people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries. We 
may wonder who is supposed to develop who… 
Whatever the results, the positive outcomes of the almost reached target of 
“3 by 5” have been taken as granted. Strangely within a few weeks in 
Cambodia, the scaling up for “3 by 5” belongs to the past. It was an 
objective, not a policy. It was a preliminary step to initiate a broader 
perspective that will receive the favours of the world: the universal access to 
treatment. Now, the entire Cambodian health policy operating against the 
epidemic wants to demonstrate to outsiders, including to the donors, that it 
is possible in a constrained setting to provide treatment free of charge to 
everybody who needs it. We have to stop for a while and try to understand, 
apart from the public health statements and the humanitarian values, what 
are the hidden and apparent ideas underlying such a decision.  
 
These ideas go far beyond HIV/AIDS issues and even health development. One 
of our theses is that Cambodia has hardly been in a position to fulfil the 
requirements of the external donors - whatever the reasons. It has been regularly 
(and recently) seriously challenged for its incapacity to improve the well-being of 
the whole society, including health issues. The country is under economic pressure 
and external experts have analysed the situation too narrowly and blindly, 
identifying the endemic corruption as an agent of destruction. Cambodia cannot 
justify its acts with its own Asiatic logic to Westerners. It is not only a question of 
communication: it is due to a broader attitude linked with socio cultural, 
political-economic representations and local practices that are not in accordance 
with a so-called and expected universal perception of “doing things in that way”.  
It means, for the deciders, that the particular Cambodian logic will neither be 
believed nor understood. To fill the gap between the donors and the recipients, the 
country needs however to show it can unavoidable overcome internal drawbacks, 
otherwise a part of the aid could be cut. Little by little, donors and implementers 
are accused to entertain a system that does not function. So they have to react as 
well. At this very particular moment, the HIV/AIDS care programme comes along. 
On the one hand, the more registered HIV positive persons, the more money could 
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be asked from the donors. It became a cash guarantee to maintain a health 
development programme, even if the money received did not reach the victims of 
the epidemic.  One the other side, it was presented as a progressive achievement 
that is successfully working, something that can even be taken as a model for 
neighbouring developing countries.  
 
It means that the implementation of a universal access to ART policy comes 
with two implications. First it is perceived as a rescuing lifebelt for other 
development programmes (including other interventions related to health 
care) that are not yet functioning if such a very sensitive humanitarian 
programme can be successful, it can anticipated that other interventions will 
also be successes. It will have a therapeutic effect. It will show that Cambodia 
can do it.  
Second, it complies with a consensual conception of a progress strategy. We 
need to pause for a while and go deeper into this point. In order to have a 
better comprehension of this second point, we need to expand the 
perspectives of ongoing development issues in the country. Along with the 
millennium goal encouraged by the UN and other huge foreign aid donors, 
combining a great diversity of scopes, health issues, and mostly HIV/AIDS 
interventions, are parts of a large package which has to fit in a broader 
conceptual acceptance of development in Cambodia. This conceptual 
approach of development is ideologically presented nowadays in a 
homogeneous way by most of the international agencies. It is supposed to 
respond to some targets and achievements that can be reached, according to 
stakeholders, by specific ways. Those specific ways have to follow some 
“methods of doing” (or the state of the art): this is what the developers call 
“good practices”.  
Good practice is not only technical advice. It represents a particular “way of 
doing” that deciders and developers have integrated as adequate values.  In 
other words, they respond to the expectations coming from above, certain that 
it is the “appropriate one”. Of course, consideration of bottom line 
requirements is mentioned, but such negotiation hardly exists in practice. 
Flexibility on behalf of the people is tacitly linked with potential disorder. 
There is an interesting number of key-words attached to “good practices”, 
and not only by chance. Programmes funded by outsiders will receive money 
only if they include them all, at least on paper. Among the most important 
ones we can routinely identify are : participation, governance, sustainability, 
socio-economic improvement for the poor, antidiscrimination, etc.  All these 
key-words are concepts and not activities, but they are presented as activities, 
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and subsequently as testimony of adequate planning if eventually there is any 
success. 
For instance, an idealist UN development text we find in many reports and 
documents states that: “Participation (a first indicator) means that the civil 
society constitutes with the State and the market one of the three components 
involved in the construction and the maintenance of an adequate governance 
(a second indicator). It can be done if civil society’s actors contribute to socio-
economic activities and behave as a group liable to influence public policies, 
in particular in favour of the poorest (a third indicator). This ideal 
description of the societal and political functioning is a prerequisite for a 
sustainable development (fourth indicator) in which representatives of the 
population are supposed to act without prejudice (a fifth indicator)”. 
All these indicators are included in the discussions about universal access, 
in a similar way. It seems, therefore, that there is a pre-configuration of the 
universal access policy (becoming a rhetoric) that nobody can apparently 
criticize at the intentional level, but that does not respect the minimum of 
medical, social and even political requirements.  
When Brazil started in 1996 giving ART to all the infected population 
who need it, there were probably less national guidelines, international 
interferences and “key words” falling out of the sky. There were drugs in 
adequate quantities and qualities, sufficient doctors were correctly appointed, 
there were well-equipped centres, public health specialists, trained 
paramedical staff, voices from local NGOs, continuous campaigns linking 
care with prevention and HIV testing were provided simultaneously. The 
deciders stimulated representatives of the civil society (in different positions) 
to act as a force of opposition, and the government wanted to have a 
watchdog. The result was that the country managed to make it.  
In Cambodian, the necessary ingredients to prepare the programme in the 
same way are neither constituted nor interlinked. An order is supposed to be 
respected, while existing improvements are not articulated correctly. In such 
conditions, how is it possible to ask a newly trained doctor, earning 35 dollar 
a month, to take care of 250 AIDS patients in an isolated provincial town 
with no existing referral system, and working in one of the worst hospital 
settings you can imagine? 
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For a political anthropology of health development 
The path to universal access is a new policy, still in process. We cannot draw 
any conclusion yet. Other facts and figures can interfere, and we have not yet 
observed them because it is something under construction. The future will 
give us new keys to understanding, but I am not sure that decisions have 
been taken only to alleviate the suffering of the infected population. One of 
the paradoxes that mentioned previously is that more drugs given without 
proper preparation led to more deaths.  
The health policy decisions in Cambodia have been an opportunity to 
pour prestige and to inject refreshing consideration for developers associated 
in Cambodia’s affairs, either national or outsiders, whatever their 
geographical and professional backgrounds. One cannot put them “in the 
same basket”. They do not share similar ideas but, generally speaking, a 
common trend can be formulated: they act without an adequate 
understanding of the social and economical context. A relevant health policy 
can be based on theoretical and discursive argumentations, but it cannot be 
in a state of levitation removed from the local dynamics. Developers should 
visit the field and remember that people exist, and have something to 
express, or at least to show through their behaviour and ideas, for their 
improvement.  Otherwise their tragic social reality remains something 
abstract. We come back to this evident notion stipulating that “we need to 
understand first in order to act”. 
On the other side, there are positive expectations. With free universal access 
to ART, the government expects to modify a common world-wide perception 
that Cambodia cannot absorb development challenges. It is engaged in a 
challenging policy but just the fact “of being engaged” is a sign of 
voluntarism22. Not all poor countries did the same. Maybe, after all, the HIV 
policy for universal care and treatment can act as a stimulator for other 
development goals and it will be consequently a constructive point. But we 
have the right to wonder whether the choice of intervention to promote 
                                                
22 We do not mean that planners and developers are ignorant of the whole reality. They prioritize their 
own perception of the reality, along with their own personal concerns that may have nothing to do with 
the expected outcomes for the beneficiaries, namely the poor and the deprived population. They 
definitely realize the lack of basic health infrastructures, the challenges and numerous obstacles they 
face in the elaboration of their project, once it has to be implemented. They know they are surrounded 
by numerous social dynamics liable to prevent the outcome of their policies, even if they have the 
tendency to argue they are right (they have knowledge) and that the population is wrong in terms of 
knowledge, attitude, behaviour, etc. They are even aware of the gap between discourse and practice as 
well, even if they have the tendency to maintain deliberately such a discrepancy because it justifies the 
continuation of their assignments. But whatever the policies, written through recommendations, they 
do not show any direction to implement the projects. See: UNAIDS, Scaling up towards uiversal access 
to HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support. Cambodia country report, Phnom Penh, February 
2006, 38. 
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treatment to everybody has been justified through acceptable contextual 
medical, socio-cultural, economic and political realities, or with meta-logics 
having little to do with health and the anti-AIDS goal as a whole but with the 
quest for the accreditation of the country, mostly for its governance that 
everybody from outside is viewing through distorted glasses. 
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